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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studies the impact of the banks’ portfolio holdings of financial derivatives on 
the banks’ individual contribution to systemic risk over and above the effect of variables 
related to size, interconnectedness, substitutability, and other balance sheet information. 
Using a sample of 91 U.S. bank holding companies from 2002 to 2011, we compare five 
measures of the banks’ contribution to systemic risk and find that the new measure 
proposed in this study, Net Shapley Value, outperforms the others. Using this measure 
we find that the banks’ holdings of foreign exchange and credit derivatives increase the 
banks contributions to systemic risk whereas holdings of interest rate derivatives 
decrease it. Nevertheless, the proportion of non-performing loans over total loans and 
the leverage ratio have much stronger impact on systemic risk than derivatives holdings. 
We find that before the subprime crisis credit derivatives decreased systemic risk 
whereas during the crisis increased it. So, credit derivatives seemed to change their role 
from shock absorbers to shock issuers. This effect is not observed in the other types of 
derivatives. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the beginning of the current financial and economic crisis, the concern about 
systemic risk has increased, becoming a priority for regulatory authorities. These 
authorities realized that systemic risk is not a transitory problem and consequently, new 
institutional arrangements have been approved to address this challenging issue. The 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in the U.S. and the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB) in the E.U. have been set to identify systemic risk, prevent 
regulatory loopholes, and make recommendations together with existing regulatory 
authorities. The concerns about systemic risk have also extended to securities markets 
regulators. Thus, the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) 
has also established a Standing Committee on Risk and Research to coordinate 
members’ monitoring of potential systemic risks within securities markets. 
In this setting it is crucial for the banking regulatory institutions to be able to analyze 
and understand the determinants of a banks’ contribution to systemic risk. This 
information would help them not only to improve currently available systemic risk 
measures and warning flags but also to develop a taxation system on the basis of the 
externalities generated by a banks’ impact on systemic risk. Additionally, securities 
market regulators are interested in understanding the contribution of traded financial 
instruments, for instance financial derivatives, to systemic risk in order to consider new 
regulatory initiatives. Finally, investors should be concerned with the extent to which 
derivatives holdings affect the systemic impact of a given bank in order to assess the 
appropriate reward required to bear this kind of risk. Stulz (2009) pointed out the lack 
of rigorous empirical studies on the social benefits and costs of derivatives and in 
particular their role in the financial crisis 2007-09. This paper aims to improve our 
understanding of these social costs and benefits examining whether the use of financial 
derivatives was a relevant factor in the destabilization of the banking system during the 
recent financial crisis. 
The spectacular growth in banks’ balance sheet over recent decades reflected increasing 
claims within the financial system rather than with non-financial agents. One key driver 
of this explosive intra-system activity came from the growth in derivatives markets and 
consequently in the growth of derivatives holdings in the banks’ balance-sheets. A 
proportion of this growth may have been motivated by their use for hedging purposes 
justified by theory supporting the rationality of hedging decisions at individual bank 
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level (e.g., Koppenhaver, 1985). This stance also finds support in empirical evidence 
suggesting the advantages of different hedging strategies for financial firms, again at 
individual level, see among others Jaffe (2003). However, another substantial 
proportion of this growth is due to proprietary trading activities by banks. Both 
activities, hedging and trading, are regarded as potentially useful and profitable by 
banks. However, it is well known that financial decisions that are rational at individual 
level can have negative consequences at system level. Is this also the case with respect 
to the banks’ holdings of financial derivatives? The, admittedly very scarce, literature 
on this subject suggests that this might be the case, Calmès and Théoret (2010) find that 
off-balance-sheet activities reduce banks’ mean returns, simultaneously increasing the 
volatility of their operating revenue and therefore increasing banks’ systemic risk. 
Nijskens and Wagner (2011) report that the first use of credit derivatives is associated 
with an increase in a bank’s risk, largely due to an increase in banks’ correlations and 
therefore in their systemic risk. However, as far as we know, no evidence is available on 
the direct impact of derivatives holdings on the banks’ individual contributions to 
systemic risk. Ours is a first attempt to fill this gap. For such aim, we combine two 
analyses; we first measure the banks’ individual contributions to systemic risk and then, 
we estimate the effects of their holdings of financial derivatives on the banks’ 
contributions to systemic risk.  
To assess the banks’ contributions to systemic risk we use the following five measures: 
∆CoVaR, ∆CoES, Asymmetric ∆CoVaR, Gross Shapley Value (GSV) and Net Shapley 
Value (NSV). The ∆CoVaR is the difference between the Value at Risk (VaR) of the 
banking system conditional on bank i being in distress minus the VaR of the banking 
system conditional on bank i being in its median state. The ∆CoES applies the same 
idea but using the Expected Shortfall instead of the VaR (see Adrian and Brunnermeier, 
2011). The Asymmetric ∆CoVaR represents a variation of the standard ∆CoVaR 
specification that allows for asymmetries in this specification (see López, Moreno, 
Rubia and Valderama, 2011). The GSV measures the average contribution to systemic 
risk of bank i in all possible groups in which the whole financial system can be divided 
(see Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis, 2010). Finally we propose an alternative measure 
to the GSV called NPV in which we get rid of the idiosyncratic component present in 
the former measure by subtracting from the GSV the VaR of the bank i. 
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We estimate these five measures for a subset of the 91 biggest U.S. bank holding 
companies for the period that spans from 2002 to 2011. We then compute the 
correlation of the systemic risk measures with an index of systemic events and run a 
Granger causality test between pairs of measures; and find that the NSV presents the 
closest association with the index and Granger causes more frequently the other 
measures.  
Then, using this measure of systemic risk as the dependent variable, we examine six 
issues: (1) is there a relationship between the banks’ holdings of financial derivatives 
and their contributions to systemic risk?; (2) is this relationship uniform across 
derivatives classes?; (3) is the impact on systemic risk the same irrespective of whether 
the derivative is held for trading or for other purposes?; (4) is the relationship between 
derivatives holdings and systemic risk sensitive to the emergence of the subprime 
crisis?; (5) in the case of credit derivatives, is their impact dependent on whether the 
bank is net protection seller or net protection buyer?; (6) besides derivatives, are there 
other balance sheet asset items which are significant contributors to systemic risk?. 
We find the following results: 
1. Yes. There is a significant relationship between the fair value of derivatives 
holdings of bank j in quarter t and the contribution to systemic risk of bank j in 
quarter t+1. Therefore derivatives holdings act as leading indicators of systemic 
risk contributions. 
2. No. Banks’ holdings of credit and foreign exchange derivatives have an 
increasing effect on systemic risk whereas holdings of interest rate and 
commodity derivatives have a decreasing effect.  
3. No. Usually derivatives held for trading have a significant effect, either positive 
(foreign exchange) or negative (interest rate, commodity) whereas derivatives 
held for other purposes do not significantly affect systemic risk. 
4. Yes and No. We find that before the subprime crisis credit derivatives decreased 
systemic risk whereas after the crisis increased it. But the way foreign exchange, 
interest rate, equity and commodity derivatives influence systemic risk remains 
unchanged.  
5. Yes. If the bank is net protection buyer its credit derivatives holdings increase its 
systemic risk.  
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6. Yes. Some variables (measured as ratios over total assets) are also leading 
indicators of systemic risk contributions. Increases in the following variables 
increase systemic risk contributions: total loans, net balance to banks belonging 
to the same banking group, leverage ratio and the proportion of non-performing 
loans (measured in this case, relative to total loans). On the other hand, increases 
in total deposits decrease systemic risk. The variables with the highest economic 
impact on systemic risk are the proportion of non-performing loans to total loans 
and the leverage ratio. In fact, their economic impact is higher than the one 
corresponding to derivatives holdings. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology. In 
section 3 we describe the data. Section 4 reports the main empirical findings. In section 
5 we present some robustness tests, and we conclude in section 6. 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Systemic Risk:  Measures and Comparison 
We consider the following five measures of the individual contribution of banks to 
systemic risk: (i) ∆CoVaR, (ii) ∆CoES, (iii) Asymmetric ∆CoVaR, (iv) Gross Shapley 
Value (GSV) and (v) Net Shapley Value (NSV). The details of the characteristics and 
the estimation of the systemic risk measures can be found in Appendix B.2 
As in Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2012) we use two criteria to rank the five measures: 
(a) the correlation with an index of systemic events and policy actions, and (b) the 
Granger causality test. The first criterion compares the correlation of each measure with 
the main systemic events and policy actions and the second criterion points out the 
measures acting as leading indicators of systemic risk. Both criteria focus on different 
                                                     
2
 Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson, (2011a, b) propose an alternative measure of the 
individual contribution to systemic risk called realized SES that measures the propensity of bank i to be 
undercapitalized when the whole system is undercapitalized. We exclude this measure from the 
discussion in the main text because, by construction, it is quarterly estimated and we cannot carry out the 
comparison with the considered five measures. Nevertheless, we estimate this measure, conduct the 
baseline regression to analyze the determinants of banks contributions to systemic risk and find that the 
results are fully in agreement with the main findings of this paper.  
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aspects of systemic risk and complement to each other to provide a robust diagnostic of 
the most reliable individual contribution to systemic risk measures.3 
In the first criterion we use an influential event variable (IEV), which is a categorical 
variable that captures the main events observed and policy actions taken during the 
financial crisis based on the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ crisis timeline.4 The IEV 
takes value 1 whenever there is an event, under the hypothesis that those events should 
increase systemic risk, and is equal to -1 whenever there is a policy action, under the 
hypothesis that policy action’s aim is to decrease systemic risk (and the action is usually 
successful). Otherwise it equals zero. The ranking method is based on the McFadden R-
squared, a measure of goodness of fit. For each bank i in the sample we run a 
multinomial regression in which the dependent variable is the IEV and the explanatory 
variable is the systemic risk measure j for bank i (where  = 1, … ,5 and  = 1,… ,91) 
and then estimate the McFadden R-squared. The comparison of the different pairs of 
systemic risk measures, referred to the same bank, is done by assigning a score of +1 to 
the measure with the highest R-squared and -1 to the one with the lowest. Finally, we 
add up the scores obtained for each measure across the 91 banks.5 By doing this, we 
avoid penalizing those measures that provide leading information and penalizing those 
events or political actions which have been discounted by the market before the event.  
The second criterion is based on the Granger causality test (Granger, 1969). To rank the 
measures we give a score of +1 to a given measure X if X Granger causes another 
measure Y at 5% confidence level and -1 if X is caused in the Granger sense by Y. As a 
consequence, the best measure gets the highest positive score and the worst measure the 
highest negative score. Next, we add up the scores obtained by each measure across the 
91 banks. Technical details on the procedure to compare the systemic risk measures can 
be found in Appendix C. 
 
  
                                                     
3
 In Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2012) the authors use an additional criterion based on the Gonzalo and 
Granger’s (1995) methodology. To carry out this analysis, the pairs of systemic risk measures have to be 
cointegrated. However, this requirement is not satisfied in several of the pairs of measures and so, we do 
not consider it. 
4
 Timeline crisis can be accessed via http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/.  
5
 This ranking procedure is related to the well-known Condorcet voting method. However to avoid some 
of the problems of the Condorcet approach we also allow for negative as well as positive scores. 
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2.2. Determinants of systemic risk  
We implement a panel regression analysis in which the individual bank i’s contribution 
to systemic risk in quarter t is regressed on the following variables (all in quarter t-1):  
bank’s holdings of derivatives, proxies for the standard drivers of systemic risk (size, 
interconnectedness, and substitutability), other balance sheet information and the 
aggregate level of systemic risk. We employ a Prais-Winsten regression with correlated 
panels, corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and robust to heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation across panels. Our panel regression model is described by 
the following equation: 
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 = 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,
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
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where the dependent variable is the bank’s i contribution to systemic risk as measured 
by the Net Shapley Value. The vector of variables tinY ,,
 
contains the proxies for the 
bank i size and its degree of interconnectedness and substitutability.  The vector timZ ,,  
contains variables related to other banks characteristics: balance-sheet quality and the 
aggregate level of systemic risk one and two quarters ago. The aggregate variables are 
obtained after aggregating the levels of systemic risk of the U.S. commercial banks 
(without considering the bank i), dealer-broker and insurance companies. The vector of 
variables tisX ,, refers to the banks’ holdings of financial derivatives. 
2.3. Research questions  
We examine six issues that have not been addressed previously in literature regarding 
the role of derivatives holdings and their possible connections with systemic risk: 
1. The first question to ask is whether the banks’ holdings of financial derivatives 
contribute in any significant way to systemic risk.  If this is indeed the case, then 
many other important questions come into play.  
2. The next obvious question is whether this relationship is uniform across derivatives 
classes or are there differences in the impact between foreign exchange and interest 
rate derivatives, for example. 
3. Given that our databases allow us to distinguish between derivatives held for 
trading or for other purposes, the next question is whether the impact on systemic 
risk is the same irrespective of the reason they are being held. 
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4. Given the abrupt change in market conditions since July 2007 a pressing question is 
to study whether the relationship between derivative holdings and systemic risk is 
sensitive to the emergence of the subprime crisis. The answer to this question could 
be very illuminating in the sense that some derivatives that were thought to play the 
role of shock absorbers before the crisis (this was the predominant view on the 
derivatives industry in general)6 may have changed their nature once the subprime 
crisis starts. 
5. In the specific case of credit derivatives, one may think that a bank that is a net 
protection buyer and therefore is hedging its credit risk to some extent, should 
contribute to a lesser extent to the overall systemic risk. Testing whether this is 
indeed the case helps to understand the actual role of these controversial 
instruments.  
6. Additionally, it seems natural to ask what other balance sheet asset items are 
significant contributors to systemic risk and in particular which ones have the 
biggest economic impact on systemic risk. 
3. Data and Explanatory Variables 
3.1 Data 
The Bank Holding Company Data (BHCD) from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
is our primary database.7  Additional information (VIX, 3-monthTbill rate, 3-month 
repo rate, 10-year Treasury rate, BAA-rate bond, and MSCI index returns) is collected 
from DataStream and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Our data set is composed of U.S. bank holding companies with total assets above 
$5billion in either the first quarter of 2006 or the first quarter of 2009.  Therefore our 
focus is on relatively big banks in either the pre-crisis or the ongoing crisis period. 
Additional filters are banks for which we have information on their stock prices, banks 
that held at least one type of derivatives analyzed in this paper, and, we exclude banks 
                                                     
6
 “As is generally acknowledged, the development of credit derivatives has contributed to the stability of 
the banking system by allowing banks, especially the largest, systemically important banks, to measure 
and manage their credit risks more effectively” Greenspan (2005). 
7
 http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/financial_institution_reports/bhc_data.cfm 
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that defaulted or were acquired before 2007.8 Our final sample consists of quarterly 
information for 91 bank holding companies from March 2002 to June 2011.9 
Table 1 contains the 91 banks and information about their size (market capitalization in 
millions of dollars). In terms of size we observe a huge variance across banks under the 
analysis being by far Bank of America, Citigroup and JP Morgan the largest banks in 
the sample.  
3.2. Explanatory Variables  
Next we summarize the five groups of potential determinants of the banks’ contribution 
to systemic risk (a detailed description can be found in Appendix A): 
3.2.1. Banks Holdings of Derivatives 
We consider five types of derivatives: credit, interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, and 
commodity. The holdings of derivatives are considered in terms of the fair value that is 
defined in the instructions of preparation of the BHCD as “the price that would be 
received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between 
market participants in the asset’s or liability’s principal (or most advantageous) market 
at the measurement date”. The holdings of derivatives are reported in the balance sheet 
with positive (asset side) or negative (liabilities side) fair values which refer to the 
amount of revaluation gains or losses from the ‘‘marking to market’’ of the five 
different types of derivative contracts.10, 11 We focus on the total fair value (i.e., positive 
plus negative fair values) because it allows us to take into account the total exposures to 
the derivatives’ counterparties and, at the same time, the counterparty risk. Alternatively 
to the fair value, we could use the notional amount outstanding; however according to 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) Quarterly Reports on Bank 
                                                     
8
 We deal with bank mergers as in Hirtle (2008) who adjusts for the impact of significant mergers by 
treating the post-merger bank as a different entity from the pre-merger bank. This is the case of the case 
of the Bank of New York Company and Mellon Financial Corp. 
9
 The BHCD provides information about approximately 7.800 banks holdings that were alive before 
2002. 
10
 Unlike other securities, derivative contracts involve two possible positions and positive fair values 
mean negative fair values on the counterparty. According to the Dodd-Frank Act, the required 
information to private funds advised by investment advisers to guarantee an appropriate monitoring of 
systemic risk in securities markets includes: amount of assets under management and use of leverage, 
trading and investment positions, types of assets held, or trading practices, among others contracts. 
11
 The statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 133 “Accounting for Derivative Instruments and 
Hedging Activities” requires all derivatives, without exception and regardless of the accounting treatment 
of the underlying asset, to be recognized in the balance sheet as either negative fair values (liabilities) or 
positive fair values (assets).   
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Trading and Derivatives Activities notional values can provide insight into potential 
revenue and operational issues but do not provide useful measure of the risk taken and 
so, could be meaningless from the systemic risk perspective.12 
Figure 1 depicts the average fair values of the banks holdings of interest rate, foreign 
exchange, credit, equity and commodity derivatives over total assets. Interest rate 
derivatives represent the most widely used derivative during the whole sample period. 
Between 2003 and September 2007 they performed a downward trend that finished with 
the eruption of the subprime crisis in summer 2007. At the time of the Lehman Brothers 
collapse, the weight of interest rate derivatives more than doubled moving from 2% to 
6% in one quarter. Since then, the holdings of interest rate derivatives have remained 
high and evolved within the 4-6% interval. Between 2002 and the Lehman Brothers 
episode, foreign exchange derivatives were the second most used derivatives and 
remained below 1% during almost the entire sample period. Credit derivatives 
performed a remarkable increase after summer 2007 and reached their maximum level 
in March 2009. In that period credit derivatives became the second most frequently used 
derivatives. Equity and commodity derivatives have lower weight in the sample. Equity 
derivatives did not experience large variations while commodity derivatives increased 
after the Bearn Stearns collapse probably coinciding with the increase in the commodity 
prices.  
For the interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, and commodity derivatives we 
distinguish the effect of the holdings of derivatives held for trading from the ones held 
for purposes other than trading. Contracts held for trading purposes include those used 
in dealing and other trading activities accounted for at fair value with gains and losses 
recognized in earnings. Derivative instruments used to hedge trading activities are also 
reported in this category. For the credit derivatives we distinguish the effects of the 
holdings of derivatives in which the bank is the guarantor (protection seller) or the 
beneficiary (protection buyer). 
Although previous literature about the effect of financial derivatives on systemic risk is 
scarce, some papers suggest the possible role of credit derivatives as determinant of 
systemic risk (see Stulz, 2004 and Acharya, 2011). Moreover, the hedging offered by 
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 The use of the derivatives fair value is a standard procedure in the literature (e.g. Venkatachalam, 1996; 
or Livne, Markarian and Milne, 2011). 
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derivatives could also lead banks to take more risk on the underlying asset. This fact 
could destabilize the banking sector if markets are not perfectly competitive (Instefjord, 
2005).  
3.2.2. Size 
The impact of size on systemic risk is increasing and possibly non-linear as documented 
in Pais and Stork (2011). Tarashev, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2010) convincingly argue 
that larger size implies greater systemic importance, that the contribution to system-
wide risk increases more than proportionately with relative size, and that a positive 
relationship between size and systemic importance is a robust result. The logarithm of 
the market capitalization (share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in 
issue) is used as the proxy for its size. This is a common practice in finance (e.g. 
Ferreira and Laux, 2007) and accounting (e.g. Bhen, Choi, and Kang, 2008) literature. 
We use market value instead of total assets to avoid any collinearity problem because 
banks’ total assets have been employed to define and standardize most of the variables. 
We add the square of the size variable to our regression to control any potential non-
lineal relation between size and systemic risk.   
3.2.3. Interconnectedness and substitutability 
Interconnectedness measures the extent to which a bank is connected with other 
institutions in such a way that its stress could easily be transmitted to other institutions. 
Substitutability can be defined as the extent to which other institutions or segments of 
the financial system can provide the same services that were provided by failed 
institutions. These two concepts are not easy to measure and there is therefore scarce 
evidence quantifying their effects on systemic risk. 
As pointed out by Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2011a), the 
dimensions of systemic risk can be also translated into the following groups: size, 
leverage, risk, and correlation with the rest of the financial sector and economy. Due to 
the difficulty of measuring substitutability and interconnectedness, they are grouped in a 
more general group: correlation of the bank with the financial sector and economy. 
To control for these dimensions we first employ some variables that could be more 
related to the interconnectedness dimension and then other variables related to the 
substitutability dimension. In the first group we consider the net balances to subsidiary 
banks and non-banks as a way to study the net position of a bank within the group. 
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Additionally, this first dimension is captured by means of the correlation between the 
average daily individual bank’s stock returns and the S&P500 index returns during the 
corresponding calendar quarter t (hereafter correlation with S&P500 index) in line with 
Allen, Bali, and Tang (2011).  
In the second group we include variables related with the substitutability as reflected 
into the services that are provided by the banks, and we also distinguish between 
variables referred to the core and non-core banking activities. Brunnermeier, Dong and 
Palia (2011) find that non-interest to interest income variable (proxy for the non-core or 
non-traditional activities such as trading and securitization, investment banking, 
brokerage or advisory activities) has a significant contribution to systemic risk; we 
include this variable in our regressions. On the other hand, the amount of loans to banks 
and depository institutions relative to total assets and the total loans (excluding loans to 
banks and depository institutions) relating to total assets represent the bank’s core or 
traditional activities. We distinguish between loans to the financial system and other 
loans enabling us to study whether they have different effects on systemic risk. Finally, 
we use the ratio of the bank’s commercial paper holding relative to total assets as a 
proxy for the interbank activities given that we do not have direct information on the 
interbank lending. As Cummins and Weiss (2010) state, the inter-bank lending and 
commercial paper markets were critical in the subprime crisis. These variables could 
also indicate to some extent the degree of interconnectedness of a given bank given that 
the larger the total amount of the loans the larger is the expositions of a given bank to 
their borrowers. The difficulty of defining proxies related to the bank degree of 
substitutability could be one of the reasons that explain the scarcity of studies 
quantifying the effect of this dimension of systemic risk.13 We define the variables 
referred to interconnectedness relative to the bank total assets. 
 
  
                                                     
13
 We are aware of only one study analyzing the effect of the substitutability dimension on systemic risk: 
Cummings and Weiss (2010). The authors study whether the U.S. insurers’ activities create systemic risk 
and show that the lack of substitutability of insurers is not a serious problem. According to their results 
even a default of large insurers would not create a substitutability problem because other insurers could 
fill this gap. However, we consider that banking sector differs from the previous one and for this reason a 
positive effect of the substitutability dimension on the bank contribution to systemic risk cannot be ruled 
out. 
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3.2.4. Balance Sheet Information 
We use several variables that refer to the balance sheet quality: (i) leverage, (ii) total 
deposits relative to total assets, (iii) maturity mismatch, and (iv) non-performing loans 
to total loans. 
One of the dimensions proposed by Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson 
(2011b) is leverage, however true leverage is not straightforward to measure due to the 
limited market data breaking down off- and on-balance-sheet financing. According to 
them we define leverage as follows:  
+!,!-./! = 0112	.''!&' − 0112	!45&6 + .-2!&	!45&6 .-2!&	,.75!	1$	!45&6 			(2) 
As pointed out by Acharya and Thakor (2011) higher bank leverage creates stronger 
creditor discipline at individual bank level but it also increases systemic risk. However, 
some empirical analyses do not find significant effect of leverage on systemic risk (see 
Brunnermeier et al., 2011; or López, et al., 2011). Mizrach (2011) shows conventionally 
measured leverage as an unreliable indicator of systemic risk and suggests a more 
detailed examination of bank balance-sheets and asset holdings.  
Other two potential explanatory variables are maturity mismatch and deposits to total 
assets. Thus, the higher the mismatch the more likely the bank is exposed to funding 
stress. Deposits to total assets have two different interpretations. On the one hand during 
financial distress periods banks could rely more on deposits (see Boyson, Helwege, and 
Jindra, 2011). On the other hand, activities that are not traditionally associated with 
banks (outside the realm of traditional deposit taking and lending) are associated with a 
larger contribution to systemic risk and activities related to deposits taking are 
associated with a lower contribution to systemic risk. Total deposits could contribute to 
decrease systemic risk because they provide a shock-absorbing buffer. 
Regarding the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, the growth of credit and the 
easy access to financing observed before the subprime crisis could have increased 
substantially the role of this variable as a significant determinant of the bank’s 
contribution to systemic risk. 
3.2.5. Aggregate systemic risk measure 
The aggregate systemic risk for each bank i is estimated as the sum of the individual 
contribution to systemic risk of all the banks with the exception of bank i, the 8 major 
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broker-dealers, and the 23 major insurance companies. This variable captures the 
deterioration of the financial system’s health. We use two lags of the aggregate measure 
of systemic risk to control by speed of adjustment to the aggregate level of risk and to 
absorb any lagged aggregated information transmitted into the current observation.  
Table 2 reports the main descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables in the 
baseline analysis. We observe that the holdings of financial derivatives represent, on 
average, a small proportion of the total assets. They range from the interest rate 
derivatives, averaging 3.1% of total assets to commodity derivatives averaging only 
0.1%. Net balances due to bank represent, on average, a lower proportion than net 
balances due to non-banks. The average correlation of the individual banks with 
S&P500 index is quite large (0.6) which suggests a substantial interconnectedness of the 
banking system with the overall market. Average total loan and loan to banks represent 
around 61% and 0.2% of the total assets, respectively. The average ratio non-interest to 
interest income is close to 0.5 and average maturity mismatch is close to 10%. Finally, 
the balance sheet category, total deposits represent, on average, almost 70% of total 
assets.  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Individual Systemic Risk Measures and Their Comparison 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the main descriptive statistics of the individual quarterly 
measures. The signs for all the measures are set such that the higher the measure, the 
higher the bank’s contribution to systemic risk. The measures are defined in basis 
points. We observe a common pattern in all of them with a huge difference between the 
mean and the maximum due to the big jump during Lehman Brothers episode. 
We then rank the systemic risk measures according to the two criteria stated in Section 
2.1 and Appendix C: (a) the correlation with an index of systemic events and policy 
actions and (b) Granger causality test. Panel B of Table 3 contains the final scores. 
Comparing the five weekly measures, we observe that under both criteria, the NSV 
obtains the highest score followed by the GSV. Therefore, for the baseline analysis we 
use the NSV as the proxy for the bank contribution to systemic risk. Some robustness 
checks using alternative measures of systemic risk are conducted in Section 5. 
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Other additional aspects of the different measures are worth mentioning. The co-risk 
measures strongly rely on the performance of the state variables and employ little firm 
specific information (i.e., information contained on stock prices, total assets and book 
equity). So, these measures provide very similar output for different banks independent 
of the bank’s risk profile. To give an example, the estimation of CoVaR for every bank i 
(equations B.1.1-B.1.3) is done using the growth rate of the market value of total 
financial assets (at system level) as the dependent variable; and a set of state variables 
and the growth rate of the market value of total financial assets of bank i as explanatory 
variables. The results of the quantile regression shows that the coefficient measuring the 
impact of the market value of the total financial assets of bank i on this measure of 
systemic risk is significant only for 11 of the 91 banks at 10% of significance level 
when quantile level is 1% (4 = 0.01) and in zero cases when quantile level is 50% 
(4 = 0.5). Therefore individual bank’s CoVaR is largely determined by the same set of 
common variables. For this reason, we expect strong similarities across banks in terms 
of this systemic risk measure.14  
Regarding the computation of the GSV for bank i, this measure includes the VaR of 
bank i as an additional element in estimating the individual contribution to systemic 
risk. But in non-stress periods (where the individual contribution of bank i to system 
risk is negligible) this measure is largely determined by the evolution of the VaR of 
bank i which is a measure of the bank’s individual risk.15 To solve this shortcoming, we 
consider an alternative measure which is net of the impact of a proportion of the 
individual VaR, the Net Shapley Value. That is, we get rid of the bank’s idiosyncratic 
risk and focus on the bank’s contribution to systemic risk by subtracting the VaR from 
the GSV. Some robustness checks are carried out in Section 5.  
4.2. Determinants of Systemic Risk: the Effect of Banks’ Holdings of Derivatives 
In addition to the banks’ average contribution to systemic risk,  Figure 2 depicts the 
average fair value of derivatives ratio held across banks for trading and for other 
purposes than trading relative to total assets. In the case of credit derivatives, we report 
                                                     
14
 To quantify these similarities, we estimate pairwise correlations between the individual VaR and the 
systemic risk measure for each bank. The average correlations are 0.98, 0.94 and 0.95 for the ∆CoVaR, 
∆CoES and asymmetric CoVaR, respectively.   
15
 We estimate the average correlation between the GSV and the VaR for each of the 91 banks. The 
average correlation for the period 2002-20011 is equal to 0.98 while this correlation drops to 0.75 using 
the NSV. 
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the average holdings relative to total assets and the average difference between the fair 
value of credit derivatives in which the banks act as beneficiary (buy protection) and 
those in which they act as guarantor (sell protection). The series corresponding to the 
average bank holdings of derivatives are lagged one period (t-1) and the systemic risk 
measure is depicted at period t such as they appear in regression (1). In general terms, 
we observe that trading positions are the most relevant for all the types of derivatives. 
The extensive use of derivatives for trading purposes could be due to banks moving 
towards innovative fee-producing activities as pointed out by Allen and Santomero 
(2001). These trading activities have generated substantial revenues for large banks as 
can be observed in the OCC’s Quarterly Reports on Bank Trading and Derivatives 
Activities but they have also led to large losses. Regarding credit derivatives, we 
observe that the beneficiary positions are on average larger than guarantor positions16. 
In interest rate and commodity derivatives panels, we observe that one quarter before 
the date corresponding to the most pronounced increase in systemic risk, holdings held 
for trading depict a downward trend, equity holdings for trading purposes remained 
stable during this systemic episode. The correlation between the holdings of interest rate 
and equity derivatives for trading purposes lagged one quarter on the one hand, and the 
systemic risk measure from the end of 2007 to the beginning of 2009 on the other hand; 
are negative and it is almost zero for case of the commodity derivatives. Finally, we find 
a closer relation between systemic risk and the positions in both credit and foreign 
exchange derivatives. We observe a slight increase in the holdings of the former and a 
significant increase in the latter one quarter before the main systemic event in the 
sample. Thus, the correlations of the holdings of these derivatives lagged by a quarter 
and the systemic risk measure during the period in which we observe the highest banks 
contributions to systemic risk were significantly positive. 
We address the first, second and sixth research questions stated in Section 2 by means 
of Table 4, which shows the results of the estimation of equation 1 (the baseline 
specification). Column 1 reports the estimated coefficients and their standard errors. 
Column 2 reports the standardized coefficient (i.e., the product of the coefficient and the 
standard deviation of the explanatory variable) and column 3 the economic impact of 
                                                     
16
 The implication is that net guarantors are other non-bank financial institutions (insurance companies,  
hedge funds)  
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the statistically significant variables (i.e., the ratio of the standardized coefficient over 
the average value of the dependent variable). 
There is a significant relation between the credit, interest rate, foreign exchange and 
commodity derivatives holdings of bank i in quarter t and the contribution to systemic 
risk of bank i in period t+1. Equity derivatives holdings do not affect systemic risk. 
Holdings of credit and foreign exchange derivatives have an increasing effect on 
systemic risk whereas holdings of interest rate and commodities derivatives have a 
decreasing effect. Foreign exchange derivatives have the highest economic impact on 
systemic risk. 
The positive and significant effect of credit derivatives may be due to the fact that banks 
positions in credit derivatives are held for trading activities rather than for hedging loans 
(Minton, Stulz, and Williamson, 2009). These authors estimate that the net notional 
amount of these derivatives that is used for hedging loans is below 2% of the total 
notional amount of this type of derivatives and is less than 2% of their loans. In this 
line, Kiff, Elliot, Kazarian, Scarlata, and Spackman (2009) state that a large portion of 
CDS buyers do not hold the underlying bond but are either speculating on the default of 
the underlying reference or protecting other interests. 
The positive and significant effect of the variable referring to the use of foreign 
exchange derivatives casts some doubts on the argument against increased regulation of 
the foreign exchange derivatives based on the assumption of the high level of 
transparency of the foreign exchange market and that they performed smoothly during 
the financial crisis. An extreme situation, such as the devaluation of the currency of a 
large country, could lead to high losses for important players in this market and could 
make the global shock that this devaluation would cause even worse. According to the 
BIS (2008) report on the progress in reducing foreign exchange settlement risk, the 
establishment and growth of the CLS Bank has achieved significant success however, a 
notable share of foreign exchange transactions are settled in ways that still generate 
significant potential risks across the global financial system and so, further action is 
required. However, the clearing process is concentrated in one clearing house (the CLS 
Bank) and this fact could have negative systemic implications (see Duffie and Zhu, 
2011). 
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In regards to the negative and significant effect of the holdings of interest rate 
derivatives; previous literature such as Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) and Carter 
and Sinkey (1998) suggest the use of these derivatives being more frequent in banks  
more exposed to interest rate risk. Thus, the Carter and Sinkley (1998) and Downing 
(2012) results support the hypothesis that banks use interest-rate derivatives to hedge 
interest rate risk. In fact, we find that the correlation between the 10-year U.S. 
Government bond yield and the holdings of interest rate derivatives is 0.91 indicating 
that the use of these derivatives is determined by decreases in the interest rate. This 
finding is in line with the one presented by Christoffersen, Nain, and Oberoi (2009) who 
show a negative relation between the use of interest rate derivatives and the interest rate 
movements. These authors argue that even if companies are able to anticipate the 
interest rate policy, it is possible that they cannot adjust the debt exposure; however 
they can adjust the swap exposures to reduce the cost of debt. This negative correlation 
could also be consistent with a higher cost of interest rate volatility during economic 
downturns. 
The effects of the use of equity and commodity derivatives on banks’ risk or 
performance have been scarcely addressed in previous literature. One reason explaining 
the lack of empirical studies on this topic could be the lower relative importance of the 
positions on equity and commodity derivatives as can be observed in Figure 1. 
However, while the effect of the equity derivatives is not significant, commodity 
derivatives have a negative and significant effect on the dependent variable. 
The holdings of commodity derivatives, as occurs with the other derivatives, could be 
justified by the search for higher yields in a low interest rate environment. Moreover, 
the increase in the use of commodity derivatives could be propitiated, as stated in Basu 
and Gavin (2010), by the movement from real estate derivatives to commodity 
derivatives coinciding with the appearance of the problems in the subprime market. 
Other theories suggest that banks could use commodity derivatives to hedge inflation 
risk, to take advantage of the increase in the commodity prices around the systemic 
event, or because they are negatively correlated with equity and bond returns (Gorton 
and Rouwenhorst, 2006). Basu and Gavin (2010) show that when commodity prices 
peak in June 2008, the correlation with the equity index was, on average, negative. In 
fact, we observe the highest holdings of commodity derivatives by banks in this period. 
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After summer 2008 the correlation becomes extremely positive and holdings of 
commodity derivatives diminished substantially from their highest levels. 
Regarding the effect of the size, substitutability, interconnectedness and balance-sheet 
related variables, we find that increases in the following variables increase systemic risk 
contributions: total loans, net balance to banks belonging to the same banking group, 
leverage ratio and the proportion of non-performing loans over total loans. On the other 
hand, increases in total deposits decreases systemic risk. The effect of the size related 
variables is not significant given that size is our primary criterion for sample selection. 
The variables with the highest economic impact on systemic risk are the proportion of 
non-performing loans to total loans and the leverage ratio. For instance, one standard 
deviation increase in the proportion of non-performing loans to total loans in quarter t, 
increases the bank’s contribution to systemic risk in quarter t+1 to 17% above its 
average level. 
No other variable presents significant effects. In particular and in contrast to 
Brunnermeier et al. (2011) non-interest to interest income is not significant when 
derivatives holding are included in the equation. This discrepancy could be also due to 
the different sample, time periods, systemic risk measures, or explanatory variables 
employed in the two papers. Size effect is not significant, as expected, given the sample 
selection bias. 17  Finally, the aggregate systemic risk level in the previous quarter 
contributes positively and significantly to increase the individual contribution to 
systemic risk but the effect of aggregate systemic risk does not go beyond one quarter 
before the current one.18 
Summing up, although the two variables with the highest economic impact on the 
bank’s contribution to systemic risk are the non-performing loans relative to total loans 
                                                     
17
 We have repeated the analysis using the logarithm of total assets and its square as alternative variables 
to proxy the bank size and find similar results. 
18
 The use of these lagged measures enables us to mitigate the potential autocorrelation in the residuals. 
Nevertheless, we check whether there is significant first order autocorrelation in the residuals by means of 
individual tests for each bank. The coefficient for the first order autocorrelation is only significant in 25 
out of the 91 banks being its average magnitude around 0.3 for these 25 banks. We conduct an additional 
test to discard the existence of first order correlation in the residuals. Thus, we calculate the average 
residual for each date across the 91 banks and regress this series on its lagged value. The estimated 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero and so, we do not find evidence in favor of the presence 
of autocorrelation. 
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and the leverage variables; the bank’s holdings of financial derivatives also have 
significant effects but of a much lower magnitude. 
Some literature has considered that the use of derivatives should not pose significant 
levels of risk to the economy or to individual corporations. For instance, Stulz (2004) 
concludes that we should not fear derivatives but have a healthy respect for them. He 
considers that losses from derivatives are localized but the whole economy gains from 
the existence of derivatives markets. Hentschel and Kothari (2001) question whether 
corporations are reducing or taking risks with derivatives, their answer is “typically not 
very much of either”. The authors find an absence of higher risks due to the effect of 
derivatives (even among firms with large derivatives positions) which in their view 
shows that the concern over widespread derivative speculation is unfounded. Along this 
line, Cyree, Huang, and Lindley (2012) find that the effects of derivatives (interest rate, 
foreign exchange, and credit derivatives) on market valuation are not statistically 
distinguishable from zero in either good times or bad times. 
Our results do not imply that the use of derivatives by banks is inconsequential as far as 
systemic risk is concerned. They do imply that their impact, albeit statistically 
significant, plays a second fiddle in comparison with traditional variables such as 
leverage or the proportion of non-performing loans over total loans. Furthermore, the 
use of derivatives could indirectly affect the systemic contribution of banks given that 
derivatives require limited up-front payments and enable banks to take more leveraged 
positions. Additionally, the use of derivatives could lead to diminished monitoring of 
loans when the banks are considered to have used the right hedging strategies. 
To address research questions three and five we look at Table 5 in which we distinguish 
holdings of derivatives (interest rate, foreign exchange, equity and commodity, 
respectively) used for trading and for other purposes using two different variables. In 
the case of credit derivatives we use the difference between the fair values of the 
holdings in which the bank is the beneficiary (buys protection) and guarantor (sells 
protection).  
Derivatives held for purposes other than trading do not significantly contribute to 
systemic risk. However, foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives for trading 
purposes and to lesser extent equity derivatives affect systemic risk.  
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We find a positive and significant effect of the variable representing the holdings of 
foreign exchange derivatives for trading purposes. Fan, Mamun, and Tannous (2009) 
suggest that the reduction in risk gained from using foreign exchange derivatives for 
hedging purposes is offset by the increase in trading activities. Banks could use this type 
of derivatives to hedge foreign exchange risk and be engaged in trading activities which 
would expose them to additional risk at the same time. 
Contrary to the effect of foreign exchange derivatives, interest rate derivatives held for 
trading have a negative and significant effect on systemic risk. Hirtle (1997) shows that 
the increase in the use of interest rate derivatives by U.S. bank holdings, which served 
as derivatives dealers, correspond to a greater interest rate risk exposure during the 
period 1991-1994. This result could be reflecting that derivatives enhance interest rate 
risk exposure for bank holding companies. Additionally, banks mainly lend to firms 
using floating rates and for this reason, they could aim to increase their trading in 
interest rate derivatives when the interest rates begin to diminish. According to Stulz 
(2004), derivatives can create risk at a firm level if they are used episodically and with 
no experience in their use. However, interest rate derivatives are broadly used by banks. 
The most common interest rate derivative is based on swaps, which account for around 
70%, and in particular the “plain vanilla” interest rate swap. Banks participating more 
heavily in interest-rate swaps have a higher loans to asset ratio (Brewer, Minton, and 
Moser, 2000) and stronger capital positions (Carter and Sinkey, 1998). 
The fact that the equity derivatives held for trading purposes have a negative and 
significant effect could be due to the use banks made of these derivatives during the 
crisis. Thus, the maximum value of the fair value ratio of equity derivatives for trading 
relative to total assets is reached by September 2007 and since then; this ratio has 
remained stable and decreased at the end of the sample. 
We observe that as banks act as a net beneficiary when participating in the credit 
derivatives markets, its contribution to systemic risk increases. Given that the protection 
seller could default, a buyer of a CDS contract assumes counterparty risk, so the 
concern of heightened counterparty risk around the Lehman Brothers collapse could 
explain this effect. Moreover, as pointed out by Giglio (2011), the buyer of protection 
could suffer even larger loses if the default of the reference entity triggers the default of 
the counterparty (double default), given that the buyer would have a large amount owed 
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by the bankrupt counterparty. Even the presence of collateral may not be enough to 
solve this counterparty risk related to double default problem. According to Giglio 
(2011), the buyers of CDS were aware of this residual counterparty risk and considered 
that the best way to reduce it was to buy additional CDS protection against their 
counterparty, which increased the cost of buying CDS protection. Banks being net 
buyers of protection have lower capital ratios, higher ratios of risk-based assets to total 
assets, and are users of other types of derivatives (Minton, Stulz, and Williamson, 
2009). On the other hand, the banks that are more profitable, more liquid, or have a 
higher ratio of deposits over total assets are less likely to be net protection buyers. 
Finally we address the fourth research question by means of Table 6. As stated in 
section 2.3, we aim to test whether the relationship between derivatives’ holdings and 
systemic risk is sensitive to the emergence of the subprime crisis. To do that, we split 
the fair value of the holdings of every derivative (credit, interest rate, foreign exchange, 
equity and commodity derivatives) in two variables: the first variable represents the 
holdings of derivatives multiplied by a dummy variable which is equal to one before the 
first quarter of 2007 (no crisis dummy) while the second variable is obtained by 
multiplying the holdings of derivatives and a dummy variable which equals one after 
the first quarter of 2007 (crisis dummy). Then, we estimate equation 1 focusing on the 
role of every derivative before and during the crisis in separate ways. We observe a 
negative effect of the credit derivatives holdings on systemic risk before the subprime 
crisis but a positive and significant effect during the crisis which evidences a change of 
role of the credit derivatives. Credit derivatives behaved as shock absorbers before the 
subprime crisis but as credit issuers during the crisis. This change of role is not 
observed in other derivatives. The effect of interest rate derivatives holdings is negative 
and significant before and during the crisis. The effect of foreign exchange derivatives 
is always positive although non-significant before the crisis, but significant during the 
crisis. The holdings of commodity derivatives hedge systemic risk in both periods but 
significantly only before the crisis.  
5. Robustness Test 
So far we have studied the factors that explain the individual contribution to systemic 
risk. At this point our main aim is to ensure the reliability of our previous analysis 
proposing alternative dependent and explanatory variables.  
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5.1.  Alternative Indicators of Systemic Risk 
We first consider an alternative specification of the NSV in which we include a 
synthetic bank constructed as the weighted average of the remaining banks that do not 
belong to the system and are not used to estimate the measure (column 2).  The second 
measure represents a variation of the NSV in which we aggregate the information 
within a given quarter by summing up all the weekly estimated measures instead of 
using the end of quarter information (column 3). The third measure corresponds to the 
GSV (column 4).  
Comparing columns 1 and 2, we find similar results for both definitions of the NSV. 
Therefore, our results are robust to the use of either the largest banks (column 1) or all 
banks in the form of a synthetic bank (column 2) to define the core banks that form the 
system. The only difference when we sum up the weekly NSV within a given quarter 
(column 3) with respect to results in column 1 is that the size (correlation with S&P500) 
are now non-significant (significant). 
Regarding the GSV (column 4), which has been found to be the second most reliable 
measure, we find similar results to those obtained for the baseline specification. 
Nevertheless, some differences should be mentioned: the explanatory power of the 
regressors decreases (from 0.49 to 0.43), size now exhibits a significant convex shape, 
loans to banks and depositary institutions, and maturity mismatch are now positive and 
significant. 
Additionally, we estimate the five systemic risk measures for a portfolio that consists of 
only the 16 largest banks and compare them on the basis of their relation to the IEV and 
Granger causality test, obtaining once again that the NSV is the most reliable measure.  
In fact, the pairwise correlation between the NSV estimated in the baseline analysis and 
the NSV using a portfolio of the largest 16 banks is, on average, 0.99. 
5.2. Alternative Explanatory Variables 
As in Brunnermeier et al. (2011) we also use as an explanatory variable the lagged level 
of bank risk according to its VaR (defined in positive terms) instead of the aggregate 
lagged level of systemic risk.  In this case, the R-squared increases from 0.49 to 0.53 
and the effect of the VaR variable is positive and significant at any level of significance. 
The effect of the remaining explanatory variables is similar to those in the baseline 
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regression. In view of this, our results are robust to the use of the bank’s VaR to control 
for the level of risk in the previous quarter. 
To take into account the effect of the degree of concentration in the banking sector, we 
include the Herfindahl-Hirschman index referred to the banks’ total assets as an 
additional explanatory variable. This variable does not have a significant effect at any 
level of significance and both the coefficients and levels of significance of the 
explanatory variables are unchanged with respect to the results obtained in the baseline 
regression. 19 
6. Conclusions 
The recent financial crisis has exposed the dangers lurking in oversized banking sector 
balance sheets. One major concern for regulators has been the astonishing growth in 
derivatives markets and consequently in the swelling of derivatives holdings in banks’ 
balance-sheets. The aim of this paper is to address the extent to which this situation has 
increased systemic risk.  
First, we propose an alternative measure of the individual contribution to systemic risk 
that is based on the Gross Shapley Vale and that we call Net Shapley Value. This 
measure allows us to get rid of the idiosyncratic component present in the last measure. 
Then, we compare alternative systemic risk measures and find that the Net Shapley 
Value outperforms the others. Using the Net Shapley Value as our proxy for systemic 
risk we find strong evidence of derivative holdings acting as leading indicators of 
banks’ systemic risk contributions. However, their effects are not alike because credit 
and foreign exchange derivatives have a positive effect on systemic risk whereas 
holdings of interest rate and commodity derivatives have a negative effect. The 
derivatives impact on systemic risk is only found when the derivative is held for trading. 
Furthermore, we find that before the subprime crisis credit derivatives decreased 
systemic risk whereas after the crisis increased it. But foreign exchange, interest rate, 
equity and commodity derivatives influence systemic risk in the same way in both time 
periods.  
                                                     
19
 Detailed results of the alternative specifications are available upon request.  
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Surprisingly, the data suggest that if a bank is net protection buyer its credit derivatives 
holdings increase its individual contribution to systemic risk. This fact casts doubt on 
the real role of these controversial instruments with respect to banks’ contributions to 
systemic risk. The concern about heightened counterparty risk around the Lehman 
Brothers collapse could explain this effect. 
Finally, other balance sheet variables are also leading indicators of systemic risk 
contributions. Increases in the following variables increase systemic risk contributions: 
total loans, net balance to banks belonging to the same banking group, leverage ratio 
and the proportion of non-performing loans (measured in this case relative to total 
loans), on the other hand, increases in total deposits decreases systemic risk. The 
variables with the highest economic impact on systemic risk are the proportion of non-
performing loans to total loans and the leverage ratio. In fact, in terms of economic 
impact on systemic risk, the balance sheet items related to traditional banking activities 
(leverage, non-performing loans) have the stronger effect.  
Our results provide some implications for regulators and bankers alike. The move 
toward increasing derivatives holdings might be endogenous to the banking industry, in 
the sense that it was first originated by banks themselves. In the last years banks shifted 
their activities from the traditional lending activities toward, a priori, more profitable 
ones, like trading derivatives. But the reasons for doing that are related to low 
profitability of traditional activities. Based on the endogeneity of this move toward 
activities that increased profitability at the price of higher exposure to market risks, our 
paper suggest that some of these activities, in particular trading in interest rate 
derivatives had actually reduced the contribution of individual banks to systemic risk. 
On the other hand, trading in foreign exchange and credit derivatives (during the crisis) 
had increased their contributions to systemic risk. So the claims that all derivatives have 
pernicious effects on the overall financial system are not borne out by the data. 
Therefore, the process of re-regulation that is under way in many countries should be 
carefully designed to avoid hindering activities that are actually diminishing systemic 
risk. Financial stability is a public good that can inform corporate investment and 
financing decisions and thus any new regulatory initiative should be very carefully 
designed to give the different instruments within an asset class, in this case, derivatives, 
the appropriate regulatory oversight.  
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On the other hand, given the empirical evidence reported in this paper, the economic 
impact of non-performing loans and leverage on systemic risk is much stronger than the 
derivatives’ impact. Therefore the traditional banking activities related to these two 
items should be closely watched by regulators worried about systemic risk episodes. 
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Appendix A 
In this appendix we provide a detailed description of the explanatory variables obtained from 
the database Bank Holding Company Data (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago) that are 
employed in this paper: 
Fair value of credit derivatives: this variable is defined as the sum of the total fair value 
(positive and negative) of the total gross notional amount in which the reporting bank is 
beneficiary or guarantor.20  
Fair value of interest rate, foreign exchange, equity and commodity derivatives: this variable is 
defined as the sum of the total fair value of the total gross notional amount for each of the four 
previous types of derivative contracts held for trading and for purposes other than trading by the 
banks. The total fair value is obtained as the sum of the positive and negative fair values.21 
Commercial paper: The total amount outstanding of commercial paper issued by the reporting 
bank holding company to unrelated parties. Commercial paper matures in 270 days or less and 
is not collateralized.  
Loan to banks: this variable includes all loans and all other instruments evidencing loans 
(except those secured by real estate) to depository institutions chartered and headquartered in 
the U.S. and the U.S. and foreign branches of banks chartered and headquartered in a foreign 
country. 
Maturity mismatch: this variable is defined as the ratio of short term debt relative to total assets. 
Net balance to bank: difference between all balances and cash due to related banks22 and all 
balances and cash due from related banks. Due to accounts are liabilities accounts that represent 
the amount of funds currently payable to another account. Due from accounts are assets 
accounts that represent the amount of deposits currently held at another company. 
Net balance to non-bank: this variable is the difference between all balances and cash due to 
related non-banks and all balances and cash due from related non-banks.23  
Non-interest to interest Income: this variable is the ratio between the total non-interest income 
and total interest income. The former includes the sum of income from fiduciary activities, 
service charges on deposit accounts in domestic offices, and trading gains (losses) and fees from 
foreign exchange transactions, among others. The later includes interest and fee income on 
loans secured by real estate in domestic offices, interest and fee income on loans to depository 
institutions in domestic offices, credit cards and related plans, interest income from assets held 
in trading accounts, among others. 
Non-performing loans: this variable is the sum of total loans, leasing financing receivables, debt 
securities and other assets past due 90 days or more.   
                                                     
20
 Credit derivatives are off balance sheet arrangements that allow one party (beneficiary or protection 
buyer) to transfer the credit risk of the reference asset to another party (guarantor or protection seller). 
21
 The total fair values are reported as an absolute value. 
22
 Banks directly or indirectly owned by the top-tier parent bank holding company, excluding those 
directly or indirectly owned by the reporting lower-tier parent bank holding company. 
23
 Nonbank companies directly or indirectly owned by the top-tier parent bank holding company, 
excluding those directly or indirectly owned by the reporting lower-tier parent bank holding company. 
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Total deposits: this variable includes the amount of all noninterest-bearing deposits plus the 
time certificates of deposits of $100,000 or more held in foreign offices of the reporting bank. 
Total loans: this variable includes all loans except to the commercial paper and the loans 
reported in the loan to banks variable. 
Appendix B 
This appendix contains the details on the estimation of the five systemic measures that we 
consider in this paper.  The systemic risk measures are estimated on a weekly basis. In order to 
conduct quarterly regression analysis we consider the last observation of the quarter. However, 
for the baseline measure we also consider the sum of the observations during the corresponding 
quarter as a robustness test.  
B.1. Co-Risk Measures 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) based their analysis on the growth rate of the market value of 
total financial assets, itX , which is defined as the growth rate of the product between the market 
value of institution i and its ratio of total assets to book equity.24 VaR and CoVaR are estimated 
by means of quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). The time-variant measures are 
based on the following equations in weekly data: 
 =  + ; + (
<= = <=| + <=| + <=|; + (<=|
				(?. 1.1) 
where itM is a set of state variables.
25
 In order to perform the quantile regression, we assume a 
confidence level of 1% what implies to estimate a VaR at 1%. Once the coefficients of equation 
B.1.1 have been estimated through quantile regression, we replace them into equation B.1.2 to 
obtain the VaR and CoVaR. 
@.
(4) = AB + AB;
C1@.
(4) = AB<=| + DB<=|@.
(4) + B<=|;
							(?. 1.2) 
Finally, the marginal contribution of institution i to the overall systemic risk, which is called 
delta co-value-at-risk (ΔC1@.
), is calculated as the difference between CoVaRi conditional on 
the distress of the institution (i.e., 4 = 0.01) and the CoVaRi conditional of the “normal” state of 
the institution (i.e., 4 = 0.5 ) 
ΔC1@.
(1%) = C1@.
(1%) − C1@.
(50%)					(?. 1.3) 
On the basis of equation B.1.3 we obtain the weekly ΔC1@.
. We also apply this methodology 
to estimate co-expected shortfall (CoESi) which is defined as the expected shortfall of the 
financial system conditional on  ≤ @.
B . See Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) for the 
details.  
                                                     
24
 At portfolio level, the growth rate of the market value of total financial assets is computed as a 
weighted average of the growth rates of the constituents of the portfolio lagged one period. 
25
 This set is composed by VIX, liquidity spread (i.e., 3-month repo minus 3-month bill rate), change in 3-
month Treasury bill rate, slope of the yield curve (i.e., 10-year Treasury rate minus 3-month bill rate), 
credit spread (i.e., 10 Year BAA rated bonds minus 10-year Treasury rate) and return of the MSCI index. 
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B.2. Asymmetric CoVaR 
López, et al. (2011) propose to extend the ΔC1@.
  methodology in order to capture 
asymmetries in the estimation of the co-value-at risk. They propose the following specification: 
 =  + ; + (
<= = <=| + I<=|J(KLMNO) + <=|J(KLMPO) + <=|; + (
<=| 				(?. 2.1) 
where J(∙)is an indicator function that takes 1 if the condition of the subscript is true and zero 
otherwise. Under this specification, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) approach can be seen as 
an special case in which I<=| = <=| = <=|. As in Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011), equation B.2.1 is estimated using quantile regression at 1%. Then, C1@.
 is estimated 
according to equation B.2.2: 
@.
(4) = AB + AB;
C1@.
(4) = AB<=| + DB<=|@.
(4) + B<=|;
							(?. 2.2) 
B.3. Gross Shapley Value of Value-at-Risk 
In order to apply this methodology it is sufficient to define a “characteristic function” (R) which 
should define the system-wide VaR when it is applied to the entire system. Once the 
characteristic function have been defined, the contribution of bank i to the subsystem S equals 
the difference between the risk of subsystem S and the risk of the subsystem when bank i is 
excluded from it (	 − ST). So, the Gross Shapley Value (GSVi) equals to the expected value of 
such contribution when the N! possible orderings may occur with the same probability.  
Mathematically GSVi is defined as, 
U	@ = 1V 
W
X
X
Y 1
%(Z)  (R(	) − R(	 − ST))⊃
||\ ]
^
^
_
\
									(?. 3.1) 
where ∑ denotes the entire financial system, 	 ⊃   are all the possible subsystems in ∑ 
containing i, |S| represents the number of institutions in the subsystem and %(Z) comprises the 
number of all possible subsystem with Z  institutions which is defined as  %(Z) =
()!
(\)!(\)!.  
In order to carry out the practical implementation of this methodology, we estimate the 
characteristic function as in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) (i.e., through quantile regression). 
The number of considered banks in the system implies the main challenge of this methodology. 
In this article we analyze 91 bank holding companies and hence, we would have to estimate 
2.48E27 different subsystems. Given the unfeasibility of storing such amount of information we 
define a subset of the 15 largest banks in such a way that for studying every institution we 
consider 16 banks (i.e., the largest 15 banks plus the bank under study).26 This modification 
                                                     
26
 The selected banks are: Bank of America, Bank of New York Company, Bank of New York Mellon, 
BB&T, Charles Schwab, Citigroup, Fifth Third Bancorp, JP Morgan Chase and Company, Metlife, PNC 
Financial Services Group, State Street, Suntrust Banks, United States Bancorp, Wachovia Corporation 
and Wells Fargo and Company.  
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enables us to reduce the size of our problem without biasing the results because those banks 
represent more than the 80% of the average total assets of the whole system. 
Additionally we estimate this measure in an alternative way in which the system (16 banks) is 
composed of the largest 14 banks, the bank under study and a “synthetic” bank created from the 
remaining 76 banks which are weighed by the market value of total financial assets. By creating 
this representative bank, we take all the available information of the system (including the 
information contained in the small banks). This approach will be considered as a robustness test.   
B.4. Net Shapley Value of Value-at-Risk 
We now extend the expression for the GSV for a given bank i as presented in equation B.3.1 to 
show that during non-stress periods the individual contribution of this bank to the aggregate 
systemic risk should be close to zero and consequently this measure will be governed by the 
individual VaR of bank i. To show this, we consider an economy that is composed by 4 banks 
(Z = 1,… ,4). The possible subsystems and the GSV when we study the contribution of bank 1 
to the risk of the economy would be: 
Subsystems (S): S1T, S1,2T, S1,3T, S1,4T, S1,2,3T, S1,2,4T, S1,3,4T, S1,2,3,4T 
U	@ = 14 b@.
(S1T) +
1
3
∗ de@.
(S1,2T) − @.
(S2T)f + e@.
(S1,3T) − @.
(S3T)f
+ e@.
(S1,4T) − @.
(S4T)fg + 13
∗ de@.
(S1,2,3T) − @.
(S2,3T)f + e@.
(S1,2,4T) − @.
(S2,4T)f
+ e@.
(S1,3,4T) − @.
(S3,4T)fg
+ e@.
(S1,2,3,4T) − @.
(S2,3,4T)fh		(?. 4.1) 
In non-stress periods (no systemic risk) bank i does not contribute to the overall level of risk and 
the only term which would differ from zero would be VaR({1}). To check the extent of this 
problem we estimate the average correlation between the GSV and the VaR for each of the 91 
banks. The average correlation for the period 2002-20011 is 0.98. This suggests that GSV is not 
an appropriate measure in our sample due to their strong correlation with the bank’s VaR. 
In order to palliate this GSV’s drawback we introduce an alternative measure which is free from 
the impact of the individual value-at-risk. The main reason justifying this adjustment being the 
VaRi measures bank i specific market risk. But VaRi does not measure how much risk bank i is 
adding to the whole system. This new measure is named as the Net Shapley Value (NSVi). 
Mathematically, it is defined as: 
V	@ = U	@ −	 1V @.
									(?. 4.2) 
Additionally, we estimate the NSV measure for a portfolio that consists of only the 16 largest 
banks. Note that considering 16 banks we can define the system on the basis of a whole 
portfolio of banks instead of focusing on a core subset of banks and adding individually the 
remaining smaller banks and obtain that the pairwise correlation between the NSV estimated in 
the baseline analysis and the NSV using a portfolio of the largest 16 banks is, on average, 0.99. 
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Appendix C 
In this appendix we describe the methodology employed to compare the systemic risk measures 
described in Appendix B. As in Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2012) we use two criteria to 
compare the five individual contribution of bank to systemic risk measures: (i) the correlation 
with an index of systemic events and policy actions, and (ii) the Granger causality test. 
To implement the first criterion we carry out a multinomial regression for each bank j in sample, 
where the dependent variable is the influential event variable (IEV, a categorical variable that  
takes value 1 whenever there is an event; -1 whenever there is a political action; 0 otherwise) 
and the explanatory variable is the systemic risk measure. 
J#@ =  + 	6'&! %
'2;!.'5-!,i,j + ( 							(C. 1) 
The subindex i refers to a given systemic risk measure (i.e., NSV, GSV, kC1@.
, kC1#	 or 
asymmetric kC1@.
), j refers to bank under analysis ( = 1,… ,91) and k refers to the number 
of lags in the regression (2 = 0,1,2).27 Next, the McFadden R-squared for each regression is 
obtained as follows:  

l = 1 − 7Z+m(;nopp)7Z+m(;q=rs=t)						(C. 2) 
where ;nopp refers to the full model and ;q=rs=t to the model without predictors, and Lˆ is the 
estimated likelihood.28  
The second criterion is based on the Granger causality test (Granger, 1969). This test examines 
whether past changes in one variable, Xt, help to explain contemporary changes in another 
variable, Yt. If not, we conclude that Xt does not Granger cause Yt. Formally, the Granger 
causality test is based on the following regression: 
t
p
i
itxi
p
i
ityit XYY εββα ∑∑
=
−
=
−
+∆+∆+=∆
11
 				(C. 3) 
where ∆  is the first-difference operator and X∆ and Y∆ are stationary variables. We reject the 
null hypothesis that Xt does not Granger cause Yt if the coefficients xiβ  are jointly significant 
based on the standard F-test. 
  
                                                     
27
 Results do not change when other lags are considered.  
28
 To evaluate the goodness-of-fit for a multinomial regression, several pseudo R-squared has been 
developed. We employ McFadden R-squared due to its appropriate statistical properties. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Bank Holding Companies 
This table reports the name of the 91 banks which form the sample and related information about their 
size (average market value in millions of U.S. dollars). 
 
id Bank Holding
Market 
Value id Bank Holding
Market 
Value
1 Alabama National Bancorp 1,063 47 M&T Bank 9,396 
2 Amcore Financial 467 48 Marshall & Ilsley 6,824 
3 Associated Banc-Corporation 2,939 49 MB Financial 804 
4 Bancorpsouth 1,636 50 Mellon Financial 16,300 
5 Bank of America 140,000 51 Metlife 31,400 
6 Bank of Hawaii 2,201 52 National Penn Bancshares 758 
7 Bank of New York Co 27,000 53 NBT Bancorp 661 
8 Bank of New York Mellon 38,100 54 New York Community Bancorp 4,612 
9 BB&T 18,200 55 Newalliance Bancshares 1,492 
10 Bok Financial 2,589 56 Northern Trust 12,300 
11 Boston Private Financial 569 57 Old National Bancorp 1,318 
12 Capital One Financial 16,900 58 Pacific Capital Bancorp 941 
13 Cathay General Bancorp 1,095 59 Park National 1,230 
14 Central Pacific Financial 510 60 PNC Financial Services 19,600 
15 Charles Schwab 21,500 61 Privatebancorp 588 
16 Chittenden Corp 1,119 62 Provident Bankshares 644 
17 Citigroup 188,000 63 Regions Financial New 9,923 
18 Citizens Republic Bancorp 970 64 Sky Financial Group 2,583 
19 City National 2,681 65 South Financial Group 1,012 
20 Colonial Bancgroup 1,758 66 State Street 19,000 
21 Comerica 7,893 67 Sterling Bancshares 621 
22 Commerce Bancshares 2,989 68 Sterling Financial 572 
23 Community Bank System 571 69 Suntrust Banks 18,700 
24 Cullen Frost Bankers 2,537 70 Susquehanna Bancshares 1,004 
25 CVB Financial 878 71 SVB Financial Group 1,503 
26 East West Bancorp 1,418 72 Synovus Financial 6,150 
27 FNB 978 73 TCF Financial 2,986 
28 Fifth Third Bancorp 21,300 74 Texas Capital Bancshares 547 
29 First Citizens Bancorporation 411 75 Trustmark 1,488 
30 First Commonwealth Financial 761 76 United States Bancorp 46,700 
31 First Horizon National 3,939 77 Ucbh Holdings 921 
32 First Midwest Bancorp 1,280 78 UMB Financial 1,310 
33 First National of Nebraska 1,222 79 Umpqua Holdings 817 
34 Firstmerit 1,935 80 United Bankshares 1,219 
35 Fulton Financial 2,066 81 United Community Banks 721 
36 Glacier Bancorp 765 82 Valley National Bancorp 2,390 
37 Greater Bay Bancorp 1,315 83 Wachovia Corp 48,200 
38 Hancock Holding 1,040 84 Webster Financial 1,762 
39 Harleysville National Corp 450 85 Wells Fargo and Company 104,000 
40 Huntington Bancshares 4,518 86 Wesbanco 530 
41 Iberiabank 583 87 Western Alliance Bancorp 580 
42 International Bancshares 1,405 88 Whitney Holding Corp 1,411 
43 Investors Bancorp 1,480 89 Wilmington Trust 1,924 
44 Investors Financial Services 3,005 90 Wintrust Financial 776 
45 JP Morgan Chase and Co 117,000 91 Zions Bancorporation 5,051 
46 Keycorp 10,200 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, and number of observations) of the five groups of determinants of 
systemic risk under analysis: size (log market value); interconnectedness and substitutability (commercial paper, loan to banks, total loans, non-interest to interest income, 
correlation with S&P500, net balances due to banks, net balances due to non-banks); balance sheet (leverage, maturity mismatch, total deposits and non-performing loans); 
aggregate systemic risk; banks holdings of derivatives (fair value of credit, interest rate, foreign exchange, equity and commodity derivatives). 
 
 
Mean Median Stard. Dev. Max. Min. N. Obs.
Log market value 14.778 14.872 0.391 19.428 9.258 3154
Comercial paper/TA 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.095 0.000 3154
Loan  to banks/TA 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.071 0.000 3154
Total loans/TA 0.611 0.615 0.043 0.937 0.012 3154
Non-interest to interest income/TA 0.500 0.493 0.125 5.305 -0.648 3154
Correlation with S&P500 0.592 0.615 0.148 0.956 -0.555 3154
Net balance to bank/TA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 -0.023 3154
Net balance to non-bank/TA 0.012 0.012 0.004 0.060 0.000 3154
Leverage 9.893 6.690 7.739 17.890 0.260 3154
Maturity mismatch 0.095 0.095 0.036 0.640 0.000 3151
Total deposits/TA 0.685 0.686 0.040 0.905 0.001 3154
Non-performing loans/Total loans 0.015 0.009 0.014 0.162 0.000 3154
Aggregate systemic risk measure 0.098 0.046 0.106 38.578 7.363 3154
Credit derivatives/TA 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.486 0.000 3154
Interest rate derivatives/TA 0.031 0.027 0.015 1.653 0.000 3154
Foreign exchange derivatives/TA 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.257 0.000 3154
Equity derivatives/TA 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.087 0.000 3154
Commodity derivatives/TA 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.206 0.000 3154
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Table 3: Systemic Risk Measures: Descriptive Statistics and Ranking 
This table reports the main descriptive statistics of the systemic risk measures and their ranking based on 
the average McFadden R-squared and Granger causality test. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of 
five systemic risk measures in basis points: Net Shapley value (NSV), Gross Shapley Value (GSV), Co-
risk measures (∆CoVaR and ∆CoES), and asymmetric ∆CoVaR. They are reported on quarterly basis 
calculated at the last week of the corresponding quarter. Panel B reports the ranking scores for the 
systemic risk measures. The comparison of different pairs of systemic risk measures, referred to the same 
bank, based on the McFadden R-squared criterion is done by assigning a score of +1 to the measure with 
the highest R-squared and -1 to the lowest. The comparison based on the Granger causality test is done by 
applying the test to pairs of systemic risk measures, referred to the same bank, and giving a score of +1 to 
measure X if X Granger causes another measure Y at 5% confidence level and -1 if X is caused in the 
Granger sense by Y. Finally we add up the scores obtained by each measure across the 91 banks to obtain 
the one with highest score. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Median Stard. 
Dev.
Max. Min. N. Obs.
Net Shapley Value 11.07 6.21 11.44 176.39 -76.03 3154
Gross Shapley Value 93.22 82.33 49.34 546.15 6.08 3154
Delta co-value-at-risk 745.63 641.86 486.21 3205.45 22.69 3154
Delta co expected shortfall 454.96 396.00 306.43 2216.00 -303.65 3154
Asymmetric Delta co-value-at-risk 765.25 660.07 488.35 4327.27 -151.70 3154
Panel A
Net Shapley 
Value
Gross 
Shapley 
Value 
Delta co-value-
at-risk
Delta co-expected-
shortfall
Asymmetric Delta 
co-value-at-risk
McFadden R-
squared 266 84 -44 -280 -26
Granger 
causality test 13 10 -20 -1 -2
Total 279 94 -64 -281 -28
Panel B
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Table 4: Baseline Regression 
This table reports the results of the baseline unbalanced panel regressions. The dependent variable is the 
individual contribution to systemic risk measured as the Net Shapley Value which is measured in basis 
points. Our database is formed of 91 banks and spans from 1Q2002 to 2Q2011. We estimate the 
coefficients by means of a Prais-Winsten robust to heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation across 
panels. Column 1 reports the results where bank holdings of derivatives are measured by means of the total 
fair value (sum of positive and negatives). Column 2 reports the standardized coefficient (i.e., the 
regression coefficient as in column 1 times standard deviation of the corresponding explanatory variable). 
Column 3 contains the standardized coefficient (as in column 2) over the mean of the dependent variable 
(in percentage) for the variables which are different from zero at 1 or 5% significance levels. The symbol 
*** (**) denotes the significance level at 1% (5%). The results correspond to the estimated coefficient and 
the robust standard errors.  
 
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient 
[SE]
Standardized 
coefficient
Economic 
Impact (%)
Log market value t-1 
-4.16       
[2.51] -1.627
Log of squared market value t-1 0.09         [0.08] 1.006
Commercial paper t-1 /TA
30.62      
[31.56] 0.051
Loan to banks t-1 /TA 
19.71      
[44.78] 0.032
Total loans t-1 /TA 
9.67***    
[2.84] 0.416 3.755
Non-interest to interest income t-1 
0.79         
[0.83] 0.099
Correlation with S&P500 t-1
2.36         
[2.89] 0.349
Net balance to bank t-1 /TA 
477.97***    
[95.60] 0.200 1.803
Net balance to non-bank t-1 /TA 
-23.38    
[17.40] -0.098
Leverage t-1
0.15***    
[0.04] 1.161 10.486
Maturity mismatch t-1 
0.21         
[2.62] 0.007
Total deposits t-1 /TA 
-18.16***       
[3.47] -0.719 -6.493
Non-performing loans t-1 /Total loans 136.40***    [44.56] 1.955 17.655
Aggregate systemic risk measue t-1
67.13***    
[16.82] 7.147 64.550
Aggregate systemic risk measue t-2
-27.54    
[16.51] -2.932
Credit derivatives t-1  /TA
34.33***    
[8.22] 0.110 0.989
Interest rate derivatives t-1  /TA
-11.51***    
[2.78] -0.168 -1.517
Foreign exchange derivatives t-1 /TA
93.58***    
[24.68] 0.225 2.036
Equity derivatives t-1  /TA
-39.55    
[43.21] -0.028 -0.256
Commodity derivatives t-1  /TA
-26.29**    
[12.36] -0.031 -0.276
Constant 46.06**    [19.82]
Time Effects Yes
Number of Observations 2947
Number of Groups 91
Min. Observations per Group 13
Avg. Observations per Group 33.2
Max. Observations per Group 36
R-squared 0.4904
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Table 5: Analysis of the held position 
This table reports the results of a variation in the baseline unbalanced panel regressions in which we focus 
on the held position on derivatives. For credit derivatives we study the difference between fair value of 
holdings in which the bank is the beneficiary and the holdings in which the bank is the guarantor. For 
interest rate, foreign exchange, equity and commodity derivatives we distinguish holdings used for trading 
and for purposes other than trading using two different variables. The dependent variable is the individual 
contribution to systemic risk measured as the Net Shapley Value which is measured in basis points. Our 
database is formed of 91 banks and spans from 1Q2002 to 2Q2011. We estimate the coefficients by means 
of a Prais-Winsten robust to heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation across panels. Column 1 
reports the coefficients relative to holdings of derivatives. Column 2 reports the economic impact in 
percentage. It is assessed as the standardized coefficient over the mean of the dependent variable and is 
reported for the variables which are different from zero at 1 or 5% significance levels. The symbol *** 
(**) denotes that the variable is significant at 1% (5%). The results correspond to the estimated coefficient 
and the robust standard errors.  
 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
Coefficient 
[SE]
Economic 
Impact (%)
Beneficiary minus Guarantor t-1  / TA  932.01***        [357.42]
1.242
Interest rate derivatives held for purposes other than trading t-1 /TA  224.71        [117.51]
Interest rate derivatives held for trading t-1 /TA  -8.44***        [2.79]
-1.021
Foreign exchange derivatives held for purposes other than trading t-1 /TA  60.3        [242.19]
Foreign exchange derivatives held for trading t-1 /TA  102.63***        [26.09]
2.098
Equity derivatives held for purposes other than trading t-1 /TA  105.07        [62.01]
Equity derivatives held for trading t-1 /TA  -145.03**        [58.43]
-0.737
Commodity derivatives held for purposes other than trading t-1 /TA  -2498.5       [2,927]
Commodity derivatives held for trading t-1 /TA  -18.65        [12.74]
Constant 57.15***        [19.22]
Control variables Yes
Time Effects Yes
Number of Observations 2947
Number of Groups 91
R-squared 0.4934
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Table 6: Sensitivity to the subprime crisis 
This table reports the results of a variation in the baseline unbalanced panel regressions in which we distinguish the role before and during the crisis of every derivative in a 
separate way. The dependent variable is the individual contribution to systemic risk measured as the Net Shapley Value which is measured in basis points. Our database is 
formed of 91 banks and spans from 1Q2002 to 2Q2011. We estimate the coefficients by means of a Prais-Winsten robust to heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation 
across panels. We split the holdings of derivatives in two variables: the first variable represents the holdings of derivatives up to the first quarter of 2007 and the second 
variable represents the holdings of credit derivatives after the first quarter of 2007. We consider the total fair value of credit (column 1), interest rate (column 2), foreign 
exchange (column 3), equity (column 4) and commodity (column 5) derivatives. The results presented correspond to the estimated coefficient relative to holdings of 
derivatives. The symbol *** (**) denotes the significance level at 1% (5%). 
 
Coefficient Economic 
Impact 
Coefficient Economic 
Impact 
Coefficient Economic 
Impact 
Coefficient Economic 
Impact 
Coefficient Economic 
Impact 
Credit derivatives t-1  /TA * no crisis dummy -115.82                                 
Credit derivatives t-1  /TA * crisis dummy 24.16**     0.74                                 
Credit derivatives t-1  /TA          42.13**        1.22 1.13 0.03 23.12 31.56***       0.91
Interest rate derivatives t-1  /TA * no crisis dummy         -10.69***        -1.30                         
Interest rate derivativest-1 /TA * crisis dummy         -12.78***        -2.32                         
Interest rate derivatives t-1  /TA -10.65***    -1.40         -8.67***      -1.14 -10.67***       -1.41 -11.37***       -1.50
Foreign exchange derivatives t-1 /TA  * no crisis dummy                 57.71                 
Foreign exchange derivativest-1 /TA  * crisis dummy                 123.03***       4.03                 
Foreign exchange derivatives t-1 /TA 94.58***       2.07 91.75***       2.01         94.73***       2.08 93.69***       2.05
Equity derivatives t-1  /TA * no crisis dummy                         -65.31         
Equity derivativest-1 /TA * crisis dummy                         -6.75         
Equity derivatives t-1  /TA -11.59 -45.79       -18.63         -39.84
Commodity derivatives t-1  /TA * no crisis dummy                                 -37.54**        -0.28
Commodity derivatives t-1  /TA * crisis dummy                                 -13.48
Commodity derivatives t-1  /TA -22.72       -26.71**       -0.28 -24.98**        -0.26 -26.17**       -0.28         
Constant 46.72**       46.79**        45.46**     44.75**       46.41**       
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2947 2947 2947 2947 2947
Number of Groups 91 91 91 91 91
R-squared 0.4908 0.4905 0.4922 0.4906 0.4905
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Table 7: Alternative Dependent Variables 
This table reports the results of a variation in the baseline unbalanced panel regression in which different 
specifications of the dependent variable (contributions to systemic risk) are considered while the 
explanatory variables employed do not change. Our database is formed of 91 banks and spans from 
1Q2002 to 2Q2011. We estimate the coefficients by means of a Prais-Winsten robust to heteroskedasticity, 
contemporaneous correlation across panels. This table reports the results of using alternative contributions 
to systemic risk: (1) Net Shapley Value at the end of the quarter (baseline); (2) Net Shapley Value using 
the alternative approach at the end of the quarter; (3) sum of the Net Shapley Value for the corresponding 
quarter; and (4) Gross Shapley Value the end of the quarter. All dependent variables are measures on basis 
points. The results presented correspond to the estimated coefficient and the robust standard errors. The 
symbol *** (**) denotes that the variable is significant at 1% (5%). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient 
[SE]
Coefficient 
[SE]
Coefficient 
[SE]
Coefficient 
[SE]
Log market value t-1 
-4.16*       
[2.51]
-4.56*       
[2.51]
-35.82       
[27.72]
-50.56***       
[14.09]
Log of squared market value t-1 0.09         [0.08]
0.1          
[0.08]
0.52         
[0.92]
1.36***       
[0.45]
Commercial paper t-1 /TA
30.62       
[31.56]
21.28       
[31.72]
551.55       
[346.68]
126.32       
[119.26]
Loan to banks t-1 /TA 
19.71       
[44.78]
27.56       
[45.01]
181.18       
[514.13]
613.85***       
[161.47]
Total loans t-1 /TA 
9.67***       
[2.84]
9.97***       
[2.86]
110.01***       
[32.80]
44.83***       
[14.29]
Non-interest to interest income t-1 
0.79         
[0.83]
0.92         
[0.83]
10.47       
[7.80]
-1.51       
[2.24]
Correlation with S&P500 t-1 
2.36         
[2.89]
2.35         
[2.89]
75.40**       
[35.22]
-2.96       
[12.94]
Net balance to bank t-1 /TA 
477.97***       
[95.60]
447.92***       
[92.88]
6,174***       
[1,162]
2,015***       
[505.89]
Net balance to non-bank t-1 /TA 
-23.38       
[17.40]
-29.04       
[17.74]
-309.18       
[200.89]
-133.57       
[82.80]
Leverage t-1
0.15***       
[0.04]
0.14***       
[0.04]
2.43***       
[0.51]
0.67***       
[0.23]
Maturity mismatch t-1 
0.21         
[2.62]
1.2           
[2.65]
-15.88       
[32.46]
28.75**       
[11.58]
Total deposits t-1 /TA 
-18.16***       
[3.47]
-18.41***       
[3.47]
-272.39***       
[38.30]
-91.69***       
[13.23]
Non-performing loans t-1 /Total loans 136.40***       [44.56]
136.01***       
[44.18]
1,589***       
[473.29]
621.52***       
[208.39]
Aggregate systemic risk measue t-1 
67.13***       
[16.82]
67.34***       
[16.91]
217.16***       
[47.27]
-81.61***       
[15.53]
Aggregate systemic risk measue t-2 
-27.54*       
[16.51]
-28.04*       
[16.59]
-82.16*       
[44.88]
35.82**       
[15.67]
Credit derivatives t-1  /TA 34.33***       [8.22]
34.09***       
[8.26]
519.29***       
[115.95]
157.80***       
[35.51]
Interest rate derivatives t-1  /TA
-11.51***       
[2.78]
-11.52***       
[2.78]
-145.13***       
[35.40]
-79.00***       
[12.78]
Foreign exchange derivatives t-1 /TA
93.58***       
[24.68]
95.98***       
[24.79]
1,096***       
[235.50]
491.97***       
[94.39]
Equity derivatives t-1  /TA -39.55       [43.21]
-33.33       
[43.06]
-525.38       
[511.51]
57.15       
[224.77]
Commodity derivatives t-1  /TA -26.29**       [12.36]
-26.08**       
[12.38]
-413.13**       
[170.97]
-223.01***       
[66.36]
Constant 46.06**       [19.82]
49.83**       
[19.78]
526.94**       
[215.78]
516.99***       
[110.02]
Time Effects
Number of Observations 2947 2947 3038 2947
Number of Groups 91 91 91 91
Min. Observations per Group 13 13 14 13
Avg. Observations per Group 33.2 33.2 33.4 33.2
Max. Observations per Group 36 36 37 36
R-squared 0.4904 0.4907 0.5795 0.4252
Yes
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Figure 1: Banks’ holdings of derivatives relative to total assets. This figure depicts the 
average ratio across banks of the fair value of derivatives holdings relative to total assets. The 
figure includes the following types of derivatives: interest rate, foreign exchange, credit, equity 
and commodity. The ratio is reported in percentages. 
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Figure 2: Systemic risk measure and banks’ holdings of derivatives held for trading and 
for purposes other than trading relative to total assets. This figure depicts the average ratio 
across banks of the fair value of derivatives held for trading and for purposes other than trading 
relative to total assets (in percentages) in addition to the banks’ average contribution to systemic 
risk (in basis points). The systemic risk measure is the average Net Shapley value across the 91 
bank holdings (right axis). The figure includes the following types of derivatives (by order of 
appearance): interest rate, foreign exchange, credit, equity and commodity. In the case of credit 
derivatives, we report the average holdings relative to total assets and the average difference 
between the fair value of credit derivatives in which the banks act as beneficiary (buy 
protection) and those in which they act as guarantor (sell protection). The series corresponding 
to the average bank holdings of derivatives are lagged one period (t-1) and the systemic risk 
measure is depicted at period t such as they appear in the paper regressions.  
 
